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Resumo 
Algumas potências emergentes interligam as suas economias com as dos seus vizinhos, 
transformando-se em plataformas geoeconómicas das suas respetivas regiões. À 
primeira vista, o Brasil aparece como um exemplo típico deste fenómeno: é o principal 
parceiro comercial de vários dos seus vizinhos, grandes companhias públicas ou 
privadas como Petrobras e Vale realizam grandes investimentos na América do Sul, e o 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento tem apoiado massivamente a expansão regional 
das firmas brasileiras. Porém, um olhar mais detalhado sobre a integração física da 
América do Sul e o papel do Brasil nela leva a conclusões menos definitivas. Mediante 
a análise de quatro dimensões de centralidade geoeconómica (nomeadamente a 
localização, distância e geografia física; a infraestrutura de transporte; o potencial de 
complementaridade económica e as estratégias políticas), este artigo mostra que uma 
maior integração económica regional é improvável e que as perspetivas de o Brasil se 
tornar um nodo geoconómico são escassas, especialmente para além do Cone Sul. 
 
Palavras-chave: centralidade geoeconómica, integração económica regional, América 
do Sul, Brasil. 
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Abstract 
Some emerging states tie the economies of their neighboring countries together; they 
have become geoeconomic nodes of their respective regions. At first glance, Brazil is a 
typical case for this phenomenon: it is the most important trading partner for several 
of its neighbors, giant public and private companies such as Petrobras and Vale have 
become major investors in South America, and the state-owned National Development 
Bank massively supports the regional expansion of Brazilian firms. Yet, a closer look at 
physical integration in South America and Brazil’s economic role therein leads to more 
nuanced conclusions. By analyzing four dimensions of geoeconomic nodality, first 
location, distance and physical geography, second transport infrastructure, third 
economic complementarity and fourth political strategies, we show that regional 
economic integration is unlikely to progress much further and that Brazil’s prospects as 
a geoeconomic node are dim, especially regarding its non-Southern Cone neighbors. 
 
Key-words: geoeconomic node, regional economic integration, South America, 
Brazil. 
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Is there a Geoeconomic Node in South America? Geography, 
Politics and Brazil’s Role in Regional Economic Integration 
 
Introduction 
Some emerging states tie the economies of their neighboring countries together; they 
have become geoeconomic nodes of their respective region. At first glance, it seems 
that Brazil is a typical case for this phenomenon. First, Brazil is by far the most 
important trading partner of Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay, and closely so of 
Uruguay. The Andean countries and Venezuela are becoming more and more 
attractive for investment by Brazil’s largest enterprises. Second, Brazil possesses a 
geographically central position in the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional 
Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). The vision that guides IIRSA is that highways 
and waterways will connect the Atlantic to the Pacific, crossing the Amazon Basin and 
the Andes. Pipelines for oil and natural gas shall link the growing Brazilian market to 
Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela, and national electricity grids shall connect 
with each other. Third, the state-owned National Development Bank (BNDES) 
massively supports the regional expansion of Brazilian energy and construction firms 
through loans conceded to neighboring governments. In short, regional economic 
integration has been defined as a strategic goal for the Brazilian government. 
Yet, a closer look at regional integration in South America and Brazil’s economic role 
therein leads to more nuanced conclusions. We will show that distance and physical 
barriers hinder close economic ties between Brazil and its non-Southern Cone 
neighbors. Transregional transport infrastructure is deeply inadequate. IIRSA has, so 
far, remained a vision. What is more, the South American countries mostly export 
primary sector products to the cores of the global economy. Intraregional trade is not 
essential to them. For Brazil, regional markets are of minor relevance in comparison to 
overseas markets. Political obstacles to regional economic cooperation further reduce 
Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality. 
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We define geoeconomic nodes as geographic cores of economic networks. The 
economic flows of all other units that are part of an according system are focused on 
the geoeconomic node. We operationalize this dependent variable by quantitative and 
qualitative data on intraregional trade and core-country investment in the region. Our 
analysis of Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality is based on two essential sets of independent 
variables: geographical conditions and political strategies. To us, geographical 
conditions comprise nature and man-made structures in geographical space that 
cannot be altered in the short run. They provide constraints and opportunities. We 
address three categories of geographical conditions. First, location, distance and 
physical geography are the fundaments of geoeconomic nodality. Second, 
infrastructure for transport, including the transport of energy, is the main means of 
expanding the spatial scope of a geoeconomic node. Infrastructure for transport 
usually reflects physio-geographical conditions. Insufficient infrastructure limits 
geoeconomic nodality. Third, geoeconomic nodes will only come into existence if there 
is some sort of regional economic complementarity that allows for investment and 
trade between the node and its periphery. Recognizing that there is more to 
geoeconomic nodality than said geographical conditions, we argue that political 
strategies are essential because they may help to overcome constraints and to realize 
opportunities provided by geography. Apparently, this will not be the case if 
inadequate strategies are pursued. Bringing geographical conditions and political 
strategies together, we seek to answer the following question: How do geographical 
conditions, interacting with political strategies, shape Brazil’s role as the geoeconomic 
node of South America? 
In order to answer this question systematically, we firstly present a functionalist 
concept that allows us to distinguish forces that tie a region together and forces that 
tear a region apart. Secondly, we take a close look at the impact of location, distance 
and physical geography on Brazilian-South American relations. We thirdly elaborate on 
the present state of regional infrastructure. Fourthly, we analyze the economic 
complementarity of Brazil and its neighboring countries, which is part of the 
independent variable, and relate it to de facto existing economic ties among them, i.e. 
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the dependent variable. We fifthly explain that policies of the South American states 
weaken Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality. 
 
Analytical framework 
More than 70 years ago, American geographer James examined Brazil from a 
functionalist perspective. He wanted to assess the probability of state failure given the 
poor geopolitical cohesion of South America’s largest state. James (1939: 260-261) 
argued that the geographical clustering and division of the Brazilian population 
constituted a disunifying or “centrifugal” force. São Paulo was (and still is) separated 
from the Atlantic Ocean by coastal mountain ranges. Transport corridors on land 
hardly connected Brazil’s most important city to other towns and the periphery of the 
country. At the same time, significant “centripetal” forces tied Brazil together (James 
1939: 263-264): airplanes linked São Paulo to towns several thousand kilometers away 
and economic complementarity favored the union, with the other federal states being 
the natural market and resource supplier for São Paulo’s industrial sector.1 
Today, there appears to be a comparable question in area studies on South America. 
Some researchers argue that regional integration has come to a dead end. Burges 
(2005) refers to the low relevance of intraregional trade and argues that the region 
lacks a business sector that would be the driver of deep integration like in Europe. 
Malamud (2005, 2011) highlights that Brazil is not willing to contribute 
disproportionately to regional integration, and its neighbors are unwilling to follow it 
without ensuing compensation. Doctor (2012) argues that economic asymmetries and 
institutional deficits hamper deepening regionalism in the Common Market of the 
South (Mercosur). Malamud and Gardini (2012) even claim that regionalism has 
peaked and delivers diminishing returns. We could adapt James’ concept in order to 
shed light on factors that have been neglected so far but help to understand why the 
present state of regional integration has been reached and why further progress is 
                                                          
1
 James (1939: 261-263, 265) also took into consideration ideational factors, e.g. nationalism, and the 
unifying effects of a functioning participatory democracy. We limit our investigation to material forces 
and then analyze how political strategies interact with them. 
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unlikely. The only conceptual difference is that we are interested in the cohesion of a 
continent, whereas James referred to a nation-state. As Scholvin and Draper (2012) 
demonstrate for the South African case, there are four analytical dimensions that 
matter for a geopolitical or geoeconomic study of a region presumably tied together 
by a state with a relatively large and advanced economy: 
 Location, distance and physical geography are the most fundamental factors that 
tie a region together or tear it apart. We explain this regarding Brazil’s central 
location in South America, the distance between its economic cores and the 
neighboring countries, and physical barriers, especially the Amazon River and the 
Andes. 
 Infrastructure for transport, including the transfer of energy, helps to overcome 
distance and natural barriers. It is a major man-made, centripetal force. Numerous 
infrastructure projects are envisaged in the context of IIRSA. In theory, they hold 
the potential to tie the region closer to Brazil. The current state of infrastructure is, 
however, insufficient and weakens Brazil’s role as a geoconomic node. 
 Core zones of population and economic activity are non-natural, geographical 
forces that we expect to have an effect on the cohesion of a region, and thusly on 
Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality, like location, distance and physical geography. This 
category is exemplified by Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo as industrial hubs that 
attract resources from the neighboring countries. At the same time, the South 
American economies are hardly complementary. The potential for intraregional 
trade is low. 
 Political strategies condition the impact of the aforementioned factors. If Brazil 
were strongly committed to IIRSA as a tool of regional integration, many 
geographical barriers could be overcome. Yet, chances of increasing regional 
cohesion are foregone because policies in South America are inadequate or even 
aim at blocking the realization of geographically given opportunities. 
These analytical dimensions were first applied by Cohen (1957), who stands in the 
tradition of Classical Geopolitics, an academic discipline that goes back to Mackinder 
(1890, 1904) and Spykman (1938). Mackinder, Spykman and other adherents of 
Classical Geopolitics sought to explain the politics and economics of their time by 
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location, distance and physical geography. We also examine the impact of locational 
and geographical factors (the independent variable) on economics or geoeconomic 
nodality (the dependent variable). Our approach furthermore ties up with Krugman’s 
contributions to Economic Geography. In a nutshell, Krugman (1991a, 1991b, Krugman 
& Venables 1993) argues that proximity matters for international trade and that 
regional economic processes tend to favor polarization because of economies of scale 
and associated agglomeration, for example between a geoeconomic node and its 
periphery. The World Development Report 2009 confirms this hypothesis: location and 
“economic distance”, meaning distance measured in costs instead of distance 
measured in kilometers, count (World Bank 2009: 74-81, 108-109). With regard to the 
special role of geoeconomic nodes, the experts of the World Bank (2009: 8-10, 260-
285) introduce the term “leading area” and call for regional clustering around strong 
markets such as Brazil. 
Modernizing Classical Geopolitics and adding a significant analytical component to the 
just mentioned contemporary physiocratic approaches, we bring in politics as an 
intervening variable. In other words, our approach is materialist and we seek to find 
out how political strategies interact with the fundament that geography provides. 
Deriving hypotheses from the aforementioned dimensions and the logic behind them, 
we argue that Brazil will tie the economies of regional countries to it and serve as the 
geoeconomic node of South America 
• if Brazil’s location, distance between major agglomerations and the regional 
physical geography favor economic interaction between Brazil and the other 
countries, 
• if infrastructure for transport, including energy, links the other countries better 
to Brazil than to any alternative geoeconomic node, 
• if there are complementary economic activities between Brazil and the other 
countries, and 
• if the political strategies of the regional states aim at overcoming constraints 
and realizing opportunities provided by geography. 
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Our main sources are studies generated in the context of IIRSA, reports by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), and World Bank data. Additionally, we resort to 
the World Factbook published by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as 
information provided by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and various 
Brazilian institutions, including the BNDES. 
 
Location and physical geography 
Brazil possesses a central location in South America: the geographical center of the 
continent is located at 15° southern latitude and 55° western longitude, close to 
Cuiabá in the Brazilian federal state of Mato Grosso. Brazil borders with all South 
American countries except for Chile and Ecuador. Because of this centrality, trade is 
not hampered by numerous border stops and there are few transit countries that can 
interfere. Scholars of geopolitics suggest that Brazil may easily access most of the 
continent’s resources and obtain a dominant or nodal role in economic affairs because 
of its central location. Its neighboring states can hardly form an anti-Brazilian bloc 
because they are separated from one another by the emerging power (Kelly 1997: 53). 
However, Brazil is a huge country. Recife in the Northeast is closer to Monrovia in 
Liberia (air distance: 3,100 kilometers) than to Quito in Ecuador (4,900 kilometers). 
Brazil’s core zone of economic activity, i.e. the federal states of Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo, which account for 10.8 and 33.1 per cent of the Brazilian gross domestic 
product (GDP) (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2010), is located in the 
Southeast, far away from the Andean countries, Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela. 
While the 2,250 kilometers from São Paulo to Buenos Aires can be covered in 26 hours 
of driving time, going non-stop by car from São Paulo to Lima takes approximately 61 
hours for almost 5,000 kilometers. A trip from São Paulo to Caracas means travelling 
more than 6,000 kilometers. The rather theoretical non-stop driving time will be more 
than 70 hours, provided that everything works smoothly. The dividing effect of 
distance is boosted by Brazil’s sparsely populated north. The core zones of population 
and economic activity of Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela are located at the 
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Caribbean coast, far away from the Brazilian border and separated from it by mountain 
ranges, rivers and the rainforest. It is quite revealing that Internet-based navigation 
systems are unable to project a route from São Paulo to Caracas. The major cities of 
the Andean countries are cut off from Brazil as well – by the rainforest and the Andes. 
The insufficiency of land transport would not be much of a problem if Brazil and its 
northern and western neighbors were adequately connected by maritime transport. 
Yet, shipping lanes to the Andean countries are considerably long: the main ports of 
Brazil (Santos) and Peru (Callao) are almost 4,800 nautical miles apart – more than 
Santos and the harbor of Miami in the United States. Guayaquil, the main port of 
Ecuador, is farther away from Santos than Le Havre in France. 
As Map 1 shows, Brazil’s population and economic activity is concentrated on a narrow 
coastal strip. About 80 per cent of the population lives less than 200 kilometers away 
from the Atlantic Ocean. As said, the federal states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo 
account for 43.9 per cent of Brazil’s GDP. Agglomerations in the hinterland, such as 
Brasília and Manaus, are rare exceptions. Since maritime transport is not hampered by 
physio-geographical barriers, it is plausible to assume that economic activity along the 
Brazilian coastal strip rather triggers maritime than continental links. Goods produced 
in Salvador da Bahia, Rio de Janeiro or Porto Alegre can easily be loaded on container 
vessels and shipped to Europe and North America. The same logic applies to imports. 
In fact, 50.4 percent of Brazil’s intraregional trade was transported by ships between 
2002 and 2012, if measured by its monetary value. If measured by weight, this figure 
increases to 63.2 percent.2 In other words, Brazil is marked by what scholars of 
geopolitics call a maritime orientation, meaning that land transport to neighboring 
countries matters much less than maritime transport to faraway countries. 
  
                                                          
2
 Percentages calculated based on data retrieved from AliceWeb2 
(http://aliceweb2.mdic.gov.br//index/home). 
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Map 1 – Population density in South America 
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These locational considerations are reinforced by South America’s physical geography, 
which is depicted in Map 2. It boosts close links in the Southern Cone and separates 
Brazil from the Andean and Caribbean countries. South America consists of three 
major physio-geographical regions: lowlands that stretch from the Amazon Basin to 
Patagonia, the Andes, i.e. a high mountain range that abuts the Pacific Ocean, and the 
geologically much older and therefore eroded highlands of Guyana and Brazil, which 
tie up with the Atlantic and Caribbean coast. Once per year, the Amazon River rises 
more than nine meters, flooding the surrounding forests. Along its tributaries, these 
annual floods occur with a lower intensity (Robinson 1965: 13-14). This apparently 
hampers transport. Bridges are washed away. Harbors along the river have to deal 
with the annual floods. Even though the Amazon River is navigable from its mouth to 
Iquitos in Peru, i.e. on a distance of more than 1,200 kilometers, maritime transport is 
risky because of shifting sand banks. Apart from that, the hot and wet tropical climate 
in the Amazon Basin accounts for a dense, almost insurmountable vegetation. 
Transport corridors built through the rainforest are rapidly overgrown by vegetation. 
Heavy rains, which amount to 2,500 millimeters per year, i.e. three or four times as 
much as in the temperate zone, wash away earth and gravel roads, and cause 
significant damage to more robust infrastructure. At the same time, the Amazon area 
holds considerable untapped oil and natural gas resources: The Solimoes Basin is 
Brazil’s third-largest reserve already today. Petrobras is further exploring the basin and 
intends to extract more high-quality light oil there. Processing of oil and natural gas in 
the region, for example in Manaus, may trigger growth in other sectors, especially in 
aluminium production because of the enormous bauxite resources of the Amazon 
Basin. 
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Map 2: Physio-geographical barriers in South America 
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Southwestward of the Amazon Basin, there is a plateau landscape of pre-Cambrian 
origin at 300 to 500 meters above the sea level: the Brazilian Highlands. It is broken by 
low mountain systems and deep valleys. The terrain becomes very rough in the 
Brazilian federal state of Goiás. Railway lines and roads frequently traverse many 
kilometers to reach destinations only short linear distances apart. For example, a 
journey from Rio de Janeiro to Belo Horizonte took an hour by airplane but 14 by rail in 
the 1980s. Air distance between the two cities is 340 kilometers; the railway tracks 
extend to 640. The scheduled passenger service was stopped in 1990. In the east, the 
Brazilian Highlands ascend steep escarpments, which tie up with the coast. There are 
only two places where they rise in a single slope and thusly allow relatively easy 
movement from the coast to the hinterland: between Paranaguá and Curitiba, and 
between Santos and São Paulo. Given that the Brazilian Highlands are tilted north- and 
westward, rivers rising near their eastern rim, practically at sight of the Atlantic Ocean, 
flow inland for hundreds of kilometers before veering north or south. Many of them 
contain waterfalls (Kluck 1983: 84-87, 93). In sum, geomorphological features of 
Brazil’s littoral cut major cities off from the hinterland. One may start wondering to 
what extent Brazil can achieve geoeconomic nodality, which implies that Brazil’s 
metropolises are not only linked to the Brazilian hinterland but also to the neighboring 
countries. 
Only the Paraguay-Paraná Basin and the Patagonian plateau offer a relative ease of 
movement that facilitates economic interaction. The lowlands of Paraguay-Paraná 
Basin are a low alluvial plain that slopes gently southward to the mouth of the Río de la 
Plata. They tie up with the Pampa, a plain inclined eastward and marked by frequent 
floods due to heavy rain (Robinson 1965: 12). East- and southward of the river Paraná, 
the landscape is slightly rugged. The Gran Chaco consists of flat jungle plains that are 
subject to annual flooding by rivers that cut across them. The southern Gran Chaco is a 
hot region mostly covered by thorny scrub (Osterling 1986: 90). In the north, the 
Brazilian Panatal forms a plain, swampy extension. With regard to transport, the entire 
region benefits from its navigable rivers and the absence of major mountain ranges 
that would hamper the construction of railway lines and roads. This explains the 
geoeconomic relevance of Buenos Aires since its foundation in the 1530s: it lies at the 
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natural entrance of the Río de la Plata Basin and ties maritime transport on rivers to 
maritime transport on the Atlantic Ocean (Osterling 1986: 90-91). Southward of the 
Pampa, the Patagonian plateau is dissected by rivers coming from the Andes, which do 
not constitute a significant obstacle to transport. Elevation increases from the sea level 
in a succession of abrupt terraces about 100 meters at a time. The Patagonian 
vegetation is mostly steppelike so that there are practically no natural obstacles to 
transport until one reaches the pre-Cordillera. 
The Andes constitute the utmost barrier. In their northern and central reaches, they 
are relatively wide (up to 700 kilometers from east to west) and contain extensive 
plateaus and valleys, which host major cities such as Bogotá and La Paz. The southern 
Andes have been eroded by glaciers during the last ice age. In comparison to the 
central and northern Andes, they are lower. Valleys there are narrower. The east-to-
west extension is only about 200 kilometers (Robinson 1965: 9-11). Even the southern 
Andes are a tremendous obstacle to transport though. The main crossover between 
Argentina and Chile is the Paso Internacional Los Libertadores. The route to the pass is 
a slow, gentle incline on the Argentinean side, which leads to a tunnel opened in 1980. 
On the Chilean side, the slope has a far higher grade so that the road consists of a long 
series of switchbacks to make the descent. Sometimes, the path has to be closed in 
winter, when snow blocks its ends and the threat of rockfall is considerable. Figure 1 
shows an elevation profile from Santiago de Chile to Buenos Aires. It demonstrates the 
ease of movement in the lowland and the barrier posed by the Andes: 
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Figure 1: Elevation profile from Santiago de Chile to Buenos Aires 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, route via Mendoza and Rosario 
 
The Andes hold a considerable potential for energy generation. Peru’s hydropower 
potential, for instance, is estimated to be 30,000 to 60,000 megawatts (Eglin 1981: 
143). At the edges of the Andes, Bolivia possesses the fifth-largest natural gas reserves 
of the continent: 280 billion cubic meters. With a current production of about 14 
billion cubic meters per year, it is the third-largest natural gas producer in South 
America, just behind Argentina and Venezuela (EIA 2012b: 6-7). 85 per cent of 
Argentina’s proven conventional oil reserves are found in the south of the country: in 
the provinces of Chubut, Neuquén and Santa Cruz. The area also accounts for 72 per 
cent of Argentina’s natural gas resources; Argentina is presently the largest natural gas 
producer in South America with almost 40 billion cubic meters per year. The Loma La 
Lata field in Neuquén province is expected to contain 741 million barrels of 
recoverable shale oil and about eleven trillion cubic meters of shale gas (EIA 2012a: 3, 
4, 6-7). Brazil’s proven natural gas reserves amount to 416 billion cubic meters. 
Although exploitation is growing only slowly, it already covers more than the domestic 
demand, indicating that Brazil is not dependent on the energy resources of its 
neighbors. Moreover, Brazil has the second-largest proven oil reserves in South 
ICS  WORKING PAPERS  2014 
 
17 
America. However, more than 90 percent of Brazil’s oil production is offshore in deep 
water and consists of mostly heavy grades (EIA 2012c: 2-4, 6). Only Venezuela is better 
endowed with energy resources than Brazil. With 211 billion barrels, Venezuela 
possesses the second-largest proven oil resources in the world. Its proven natural gas 
reserves are the second-largest in the Western hemisphere: 5.5 trillion cubic meters 
(EIA 2012d: 2, 8). Colombia and Ecuador possess much less oil but are – by regional 
comparison – also considerable exporters. In the following section, we analyze 
whether transport infrastructure allows Brazil to cooperate with its neighbors on 
energy and to overcome geographical barriers to trade. 
 
Transregional infrastructure 
In the year 2000, the IADB (2000: 12-13) published a study that showed that 
intraregional trade in South America remained low because of insufficient transport 
infrastructure. According to a study published by the ECLAC three years later, 
inefficiencies in the transport sector accounted for an extra-cost of USD 170 per truck 
going from Argentina to Brazil or vice versa (Sánchez & Tomassian 2003: 5-6). Using 
routes other than the main trunks, added up to 40 percent to transport costs due to 
the poor quality of these roads. Border stops slowed down transport. For trucks going 
from Brazil to Argentina, they took 30 to 36 hours (Sánchez & Tomassian 2003: 49-51). 
Nevertheless, 37.9 percent of Brazil’s regional exports between 2002 and 2012 were 
transported by road.3 This affects practically only the countries of the Southern Cone, 
where roads are relatively dense and connect Brazil to its neighbors. In contrast to this, 
Brazil possesses almost 9,800 kilometers of borders with its Amazonian neighbors but 
just three percent of its trade with them is transported by road (Magalhães Lacerda 
2009: 186). 
In general, road density is low in South America. There are 19 kilometers of road per 
100 square kilometers of land in Brazil, seven in Bolivia, eight in Paraguay and ten in 
Peru. The according value for the United States, which contains vast sparsely 
                                                          
3
 Measured by monetary value; percentage calculated based on data retrieved from AliceWeb2 
(http://aliceweb2.mdic.gov.br//index/home). 
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populated areas like Brazil, is 67. Europe’s largest economies reach values of about 180 
(World Bank 2013). In Brazil, the tarred road network is relatively dense in the 
Northeast, Southeast and South but virtually vanishes westward of a line from Belém 
to Campo Grande. Only two major tarred roads interconnect the wider Amazon region: 
one goes from Cuiabá to Porto Velho to Manaus; another one links Porto Franco to 
Altamira to Porto Velho. Westward of a line from Manaus and Porto Velho, even 
sufficiently maintained earth and gravel roads become rare. Only one significant road 
connects Brazil to Venezuela – it goes from Boa Vista through western Bolívar Province 
to Ciudad Guayana. While the road network in Colombia’s economic core zone, i.e. the 
Andean highland, is dense, there are no major roads in the Amazonian part of the 
country. Curvy mountain passes make crossing the Andes adventuresome. Two axes 
for intraregional road transport, partly in miserable condition, cross the Andes: The 
recently rehabilitated Interoceanic Highway goes from southern Peru via Rio Branco 
and Cuiabá to Brazil’s Southeast. The Pan-American Highway4 stretches from the 
Colombian-Panamanian border via Quito and Lima to Santiago de Chile, where it splits 
into one branch that ends in southern Chile and another one that goes to Buenos Aires 
and from there along the Atlantic coast to the southern edge of the continent. Map 3 
shows the major roads in South America. 
  
                                                          
4
 The term “highway” may be misleading for readers used to transport infrastructure in the developed 
world. In South America, so called highways outside major cities are tarred two-lane roads, whose 
condition ranges from sufficient to miserable. 
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Map 3: Road infrastructure in South America 
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Transport by rail is even more difficult because railway gauges vary in South America: 
Bolivia, Brazil and Suriname mostly use the Metre Gauge, which is exactly one meter 
wide. Most tracks in Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela are built as Standard 
Gauge, i.e. 1.435 meters in width. In Argentina and Chile, the Indian Gauge of 1.676 
meters predominates. Colombia’s railway tracks are 0.917 meters wide (3-Feet-
Gauge); the ones in Ecuador 1.067 (Cape Gauge). This situation is further complicated 
by the fact that the national railway networks in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, 
Peru and Suriname are not uniform – gauges vary within these countries. The reason 
for this is that railway lines in South America were initially built for the transport of 
primary sector goods to the coast, e.g. coffee in Brazil and copper in Chile. They were 
not meant to serve for transnational or even transregional transport. In the La Plata 
region, tracks were built with different gauges from the mid-19th century onward so 
that they could not be used by invading armies. Even the few existing transregional 
railway corridors hardly allow efficient transport. For example, the one from Buenos 
Aires to São Paulo is 300 kilometers longer than the route by road and contains 
different gauges. The tracks on the Brazilian side date back to the early 20th century. 
On the Argentinian side, there is only one railway bridge across the Paraná River. 
Transport from Buenos Aires to São Paulo by rail therefore takes twice as long as 
transport by road (Magalhães Lacerda 2009: 203-204). Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela are not connected to each other by railway lines. Argentina and Chile do not 
use railway lines for their bilateral trade anymore because the one from Santiago de 
Chile to Mendoza, inaugurated in 1910, was cut by an avalanche in 1984 and has not 
been rehabilitated ever since (Magalhães Lacerda 2009: 187, 204). 
Against this background, it is not surprising that transport by rail does not matter much 
in South America. In Brazil, 460 million tons of freight are transported by rail per year. 
In India, whose GDP is significantly smaller than the one of Brazil, the according figure 
is 922 million (International Union of Railway 2011: 2). Transport by rail is not only 
discouraged by the varying gauges but also by the low density of the railway network: 
There are about 25,000 kilometers of operated railway lines in Argentina, 30,000 in 
Brazil, 5,500 in Chile and 2,000 in Peru. France, which is much smaller than most South 
American countries, operates 30,000 kilometers of railway lines. The Indian railway net 
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reaches a length of 64,000 kilometers, i.e. more than the ones of Argentina and Brazil 
combined (International Union of Railways 2011: 1-2). Hence, only 1.2 percent of 
Brazil’s regional exports between 2002 and 2012 were transported by rail.5 
Seeing these obstacles to economic growth and regional integration, the South 
American ministers responsible for transport, energy and telecommunication agreed, 
at a meeting in Montevideo in 2000, to coordinate their policies and to foster physical 
integration in said sectors.6 They identified twelve development axes for this purpose. 
In order to put the decisions taken in Montevideo into practice, IIRSA was founded in 
the same year. IIRSA is a loose intergovernmental initiative, a technical forum for 
cooperation on regional infrastructure, and concentrates on coordinating investment 
in projects that physically interlink the South American countries. Until 2014, the IIRSA 
portfolio will have reached USD 130 billion and a total of 544 projects. The 
development axes “Mercosur-Chile” and “Peru-Brazil-Bolivia” are by far the largest 
with an investment share of 39 and 22 percent respectively of the total IIRSA 
investment (Comité de Coordinación Técnica 2012: 14). The remaining axes cover the 
rest of South America, ranging from the southern Andes to the Highlands of Guyana. If 
all projects envisaged in the context of IIRSA were carried out, South America would be 
integrated closely by railway and road corridors, waterways and electricity 
transmission lines. Brazil would assume a nodel role in the resulting infrastructure 
network. However, the IADB (2008: i) criticizes that IIRSA does not possess criteria to 
rank projects with reference to their probable impact on physical integration across 
borders. 240 of IIRSA’s initial 335 projects are limited to the national scale; only 95 
constitute transnational ventures (IADB 2008: 10). Moreover, we think it is essential to 
bear in mind that IIRSA mostly exists on paper. What marks contemporary transport 
infrastructure in South America are all the aforementioned hurdles. They reduce 
Brazil’s role as a geoeconomic node to the Southern Cone. 
Comparing visions and reality in the energy sector confirms that even physical 
integration – and thusly Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality – is to large extent rhetoric and 
                                                          
5
 Measured by monetary value; percentage calculated based on data retrieved from AliceWeb2 
(http://aliceweb2.mdic.gov.br//index/home). 
6
 The term “physical integration” – instead of “regional integration” – is meant to stress that according 
efforts are limited to building infrastructure for transport. 
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calls into question the perspectives of IIRSA. Two years after the Gasoducto del Sur, a 
giant network of gas pipelines that would have stretched across the continent, had 
firstly been promoted by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, José Sergio Gabrielli, 
president of Petrobras, said it would take 25 to 30 years for a project of this dimension 
to become operational (La Nación 2007). Existing infrastructure indicates that there is 
only limited bilateral trade in natural gas: Argentina and Bolivia have been connected 
by a natural gas pipeline since 1972. Its capacity is 200 million cubic feet per day (cf/d). 
A much larger pipeline has supplied a thermoelectric power station in Argentina since 
2011. Another one leads from Entre Rios province to a power station in Uruguaiana in 
Brazil. It may be expanded to Porto Alegre. Various pipelines, built since the 1990s, 
connect Argentina to Chile. Argentina and Uruguay are linked by two pipelines (EIA 
2012a: 8). Brazil’s domestic pipeline network used to be fragmented. It has only 
recently been interconnected on the national level, which is expected to facilitate the 
exploitation of untapped resources in the Amazon Basin (EIA 2012c: 7). The Bolivia-
Brazil natural gas pipeline GASBOL connects Santa Cruz with Porto Alegre via São Paulo 
and reaches a capacity of 1.1 billion cf/d. It is described by Petrobras as Latin America’s 
biggest and most important energy infrastructure project (EIA 2012b: 8). Beyond the 
Mercosur, the conditions for cross-border cooperation are less favorable. Venezuela is 
connected by a pipeline to Colombia, which presently reaches a flow of 80 to 150 
million cf/d (EIA 2012d: 10). 
Given the aforementioned locational and physio-geographical conditions, it is quite 
rational for some countries to neglect regional projects. The coastal location of the 
agglomerations of most South American countries favors the import of liquefied 
natural gas instead of building costly transregional pipelines. The Andean countries 
and Venezuela are cut off from Brazil. Most demonstratively, Colombia’s oil exports 
are realized via the Caribbean port at Covenas and the Pacific port at Tumaco (EIA 
2012e: 1, 3). Ecuador is connected to Tumaco by a pipeline. Like Colombia, it exports 
most of its oil to the United States and the Far East (EIA 2012f: 1, 5). Venezuela exports 
40 percent of its oil to the nearby United States and 31 percent to the next-door 
Caribbean (EIA 2012d: 7). 
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South America’s thermal and hydroelectrical resources are compatible in the sense 
that countries rich in natural gas could increase their generation of electricity 
whenever droughts limit the output of hydropower stations if they were sufficiently 
interlinked (OLADE 2003: 26). An integrated electricity grid would moreover allow the 
full exploitation of the region’s hydropower potential in the Amazonian and Andean 
periphery, to meet the demand in agglomerations (OLADE 2003: 12). Ten years ago, 
experts of the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) argued that Argentina and 
Brazil realistically possessed a transfer potential of five gigawatts, which equals only 
four percent of Brazil’s installed capacity. Argentina and Chile, and Brazil and Uruguay 
were expected to reach a transfer potential of 0.5 gigawatts. Between Colombia and 
Ecuador, and Ecuador and Peru, a transfer of 0.25 gigawatts was predicted (OLADE 
2003: 21). In 2011, Paraguay exported 46,120 gigawatt-hours. Argentina imported 
10,929 gigawatt-hours; Brazil 38,430. These figures were mostly due to their trilateral 
trade. Chile and Uruguay participated marginally in the Southern-Cone trade with 
imports of 732 and 477 gigawatt-hours respectively. Colombia and Ecuador traded 
about 1,295 gigawatt-hours bilaterally. Peru imported only six gigawatt-hours; 
Venezuela 249. Bolivia, Guyana and Suriname did not trade electricity. This 
discrepancy of Brazil’s potential as a geoeconomic node and its reality is reinforced by 
economic features of the South American countries, which we address in the next 
section. 
 
Economic Complementarity 
There is some evidence for economic complementarity of Brazil and its neighbors but 
this complementarity is an uncertain perspective and not a concrete reality: Even a 
partial realization of IIRSA would already facilitate the further regional expansion of 
the Brazilian economy. For example, in the northern Andes, commodity chains are to 
be upgraded so that value addition to natural resources takes place in the region – 
presently, crude oil constitutes almost 60 percent of the exports of the five countries 
that participate in the axis “Andino” (IIRSA 2010a: 94-96). In the area defined by the 
axis “Capricornio”, economic development may be triggered by soya production, 
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generation of electricity by hydropower and the promotion of metal industries linked 
to mining (IIRSA 2010b: 124). In the context of the axis “Interoceánico Central”, 
agricultural (maize, soya, sugar cane) and mining (copper, gold, lithium and 
molybdenum) products are to be linked to industrialized processing (IIRSA 2010c: 189). 
Apparently, Brazil’s comparatively strong enterprises, which are already present in the 
region, will possess a much better position to benefit from these IIRSA-induced 
dynamics than their regional and overseas rivals if they occur. 
However, as already said and partly in contradiction to aforementioned arguments 
that speak for regional economic integration, Burges (2005: 440) argues that economic 
structures of the South American countries do not generate sufficient incentives for 
deep integration. He points out that most South American countries are marked by a 
monostructure of exports, which diminishes the potential for intraregional trade: At 
the beginning of this century, less than ten goods accounted for more than half of the 
exports of each South American country, except for Brazil. In Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and Venezuela, this figure even reached more than 75 percent. As table 1 
shows, the exports of South America’s economies remain focused on usually one or 
two primary-sector products. Taking the concept of economic complementarity 
seriously, one has to ask whether Brazil needs any of the goods that the neighboring 
countries export and vice versa. Brazil’s most important imports are machinery, 
electrical and transport equipment, chemical products, crude oil, automotive parts and 
electronics (CIA 2013). Thus, industrialized economies are interesting trading partners 
for Brazil. Only crude oil and chemical products, i.e. oil derivatives, can be supplied by 
some South American countries. The most important regional oil exporters, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela, are, however, among those countries whose location hampers 
trade with Brazil. Moreover, Brazil itself exports crude oil, which indicates that it 
possesses sufficient capacities to meet its demand domestically. 
Some of Brazil’s most important export products – transport equipment, iron ore, 
soybeans, footwear, coffee and cars – are imported by the neighboring countries, most 
prominently cars assembled in Brazil. Still, it appears that Brazil is undergoing 
deindustrialization of its foreign trade because of the boom of its primary-sector 
exports (Gaulard 2011: 172-173, 185-188). Although the contribution of the 
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manufacturing sector to the GDP has remained almost constant since the mid-1990s, 
the share of manufactured goods in Brazil’s exports declined from 56 percent in 2005 
to 40 percent in 2010, affecting all sorts of manufactured goods except for those of 
low technology. The share of primary commodities in Brazil’s exports increased from 
30 to 46 percent in the same period (Salama 2012: 242-243). 
Table 1: The top two export products of the South American countries 
Country Top two export products Share in total exports 
Argentina Animal feed 
Vegetable oil/fat 
11% 
10% 
Bolivia Natural gas 
Base metal ore 
41% 
17% 
Brazil Iron ore 
Crude oil 
9% 
7% 
Chile Copper 
Copper ores 
36% 
21% 
Colombia Crude petrol 
Coal 
25% 
12% 
Ecuador Crude petrol 
Fruits/nuts 
57% 
9% 
Guyana Gold 
Aluminium ores 
23% 
22% 
Paraguay Oil seeds 
Beef 
37% 
14% 
Peru Gold 
Copper ores 
18% 
16% 
Suriname Alumina 
Gold 
56% 
27% 
Venezuela Crude petrol 
Aluminium 
94% 
1% 
Uruguay Beef 
Rice 
20% 
7% 
Source: World Bank 2010, data for 2009. 
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Going beyond economic complementarity and looking at de-facto economic 
interaction, i.e. Brazil’s effective geoeconomic nodality, one gets a mixed picture. The 
regional activities of Petrobras, which is the major buyer of natural gas from Bolivia, 
are one of the few arguable examples of Brazilian geoeconomic nodality. Already in 
2003, Petrobras acquired Argentina’s largest oil company, Perez Companc Energía. The 
Brazilian giant realizes the main share of its international oil production in South 
America: 75 out of 148 million barrels per day in 2013; up from 19 out of 53 in 2000 
but down from a peak of 123 out of 144 million in 2006. Petrobras’ natural gas 
exploitation, which is almost exclusively South America, increased from 1.7 billion 
cubic meters per day in 2000 to 15.1 billion in 2013 (Petrobras 2013b). In the mid-
2000s, Petrobras accounted for ten percent of Bolivia’s GDP. It envisaged carrying out 
15 percent of its total investment, meaning USD 7.5 billion, outside of Brazil (Flynn 
2007: 18). In order to exploit oil fields at the lower Orinoco River, which are expected 
to contain about 45 billion barrels of heavy oil, Petrobras and Petróleos de Venezuela 
S.A. (PDVSA) have agreed to build a 230,000-barrels per day oil refinery in the Brazilian 
federal state of Pernambuco. However, the project became stuck when PDVSA failed 
to provide sufficient guaranties for a BNDES credit that would allow it to meet its 40-
percent contribution to the required investment (El Universal 2011). 
A survey of Brazil’s largest transnational companies reveals that each of the most 
internationalized among them, e.g. Banco do Brasil, Odebrecht and Vale, is present in 
several but not all South American countries, i.e. about five to eight. These enterprises 
are also active in numerous Asian, European and, to a lesser extent, African countries. 
Moderately internationalized, large companies appear to have a focus on South 
America: eight of the 13 foreign countries in which Petrobras operates are South 
American; in the case of the construction company Tigre even eight out of nine. If 
counted as mere physical presence abroad, meaning that the profitability and volume 
of business activities is disregarded, South America accounts for 31 percent of the 
foreign activities of Brazil’s largest transnational companies, significantly more than 
Europe (21 percent) and Asia (17 percent) (Fundação Dom Cambral 2011: 13-15, 17). 
These figures do, however, not mean that Brazilian companies dominate the region. 
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They indicate that South America plays an important role for firms from Brazil, 
obviously within the limits of lower and upper middle-income countries. What is more, 
overseas companies appear to use Brazil as a springboard into the Mercosur (Sarti & 
Laplane 2002: 83-84, Hiratuka & de Negri 2003). 
Brazilian investment in South America is mostly market and resource seeking, meaning 
that Brazilian enterprises establish branch plant operations in a neighboring country in 
order to circumvent its market access restrictions or to acquire resources abroad and 
use them domestically. Efficiency and strategic asset seeking, which would result in 
sophisticated regional commodity chains, remain marginal (ECLAC 2006: 15-16). In 
particular during Argentina’s economic crisis in 2001, Brazilian enterprises, supported 
by the BNDES, bought many Argentinian companies. This way, they gained access to 
the market and resources of the neighboring country without creating regional 
commodity chains (Burges 2005: 448). Recent company takeovers reflect this pattern: 
In 2009, Petrobras bought shares of Esso Chile Petrolera, worth USD 400 million. Vale 
purchased Cementos Argos SA-Coal Mine in Colombia for USD 373 million (de Abreu 
Campanario 2012: 14). The lack of efficiency-seeking investment presumably results 
from the low level of overseas trade in higher value-added goods and services, 
meaning that there is no need to increase global competitiveness by exploiting 
regional comparative advantages. It appears to confirm Burges’s (2005: 446) argument 
that commodity chains in South America are hardly integrated across national borders. 
In addition to qualifying Brazil’s role as a geoeconomic node as done in the previous 
paragraphs, it has to be spatially delineated quite narrowly. Basic data on foreign trade 
confirms what location and physical geography suggest: As table 2 shows, Brazil is an 
important export and import partner for the countries of the Southern Cone, except 
for Chile. The Andean countries and Brazil’s northern neighbors are economically much 
closer to the United States. 
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Table 2: Major trading partners of the South American countries 
Country Export partners Import partners 
Argentina 1. Brazil 21.6% 
2. China 7.3% 
1. Brazil 33.2% 
2. USA 14.4% 
Bolivia 1. Brazil 41.8% 
2. USA 12.2% 
1. Chile 23.5% 
2. Brazil 23.0% 
Chile 1. China 22.8% 
4. Brazil 5.5% 
1. USA 20.1% 
3. Brazil 8.3% 
Colombia 1. USA 38.0% 
- 
1. USA 25.0% 
5. Brazil 5.0% 
Ecuador 1. USA 37.8% 
- 
1. USA 26.7% 
6. Brazil 4.3% 
Guyana 1. Canada 29.0% 
- 
1. USA 21.3% 
- 
Paraguay 1. Uruguay 15.0% 
2. Brazil 11.4% 
1. Brazil 27.5% 
2. China 16.9% 
Peru 1. China 18.3% 
- 
1. USA 24.5% 
3. Brazil 6.7% 
Suriname 1. USA 23.9% 
- 
1. USA 26.1% 
7. Brazil 4.4% 
Venezuela 1. USA 40.2% 
- 
1. USA 28.6% 
3. Brazil 10.6% 
Uruguay 1. Brazil 19.1% 
2. China 14.2% 
1. Brazil 16.3% 
2. China 15.0% 
Source: CIA 2013, data for 2011 and 2012. 
 
An econometric analysis by the International Monetary Fund confirms that the 
dependence on the Brazilian economy varies strongly in South America: 16 percent of 
Paraguay’s GDP variance during recession is due to effects from Brazil. In the case of 
Argentina, this figure reaches ten percent. It is still significant in Uruguay with six 
percent; so it is in Bolivia and Chile with five percent each. Colombia, Ecuador and 
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Venezuela are hardly exposed to Brazil. Peru is, for unknown reasons, much more 
affected by Brazilian spill-overs than other Andean countries (Adler/Sosa 2012: 9-11, 
13). Moreover, the exports of South America countries contract sharply, by an average 
of 20 percent, during recession in Brazil. The impact of global recessions on South 
America appears to be amplified by Brazil because South American exports to Brazil 
contract even more sharply than exports to the rest of the world during times of global 
recession. Both trends are more pronounced for the Southern Cone than for the rest of 
South America (Adler/Sosa 2012: 7-8). 
When Burges published his critical article on regional integration, the subcontinent 
appeared to be pivotal for manufactured exports. In 2001, slightly more than 40 
percent of Argentina’s exports to South America were manufactured goods, compared 
to 30 percent of its global trade. The according percentages were 80 and 50 for Brazil; 
about 35 and ten for Venezuela. The gap was even wider in the cases of Chile, 
Colombia and Peru (Burges 2005: 442). Manufactured exports to South America 
constituted only about one to three percent of the GDP of the South American 
countries throughout the 1990s (Burges 2005: 444). This indicates that the economic 
relevance of the continent was low in comparison to global markets, where the South 
American countries sold their primary-sector goods. Today, intraregional trade still 
accounts for a marginal share of the GDP of most South American countries, as the 
second row of Table 3 summarizes. The largest regional economies export mainly 
secondary-sector products to South America, which constitute significantly smaller 
shares of their global exports. Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Paraguay constitute 
exceptions because of their highly export-oriented and regionally embedded resource 
extraction. With regard to Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality, it is particularly revealing 
that only 1.9 percent of Brazil’s GDP results from intraregional trade, meaning that the 
region hardly matters to the Brazilian economy in quantitative terms. Considering the 
third row of Table 3, it appears that South America is somewhat relevant for Brazil 
because it can sell its globally uncompetitive manufactured goods there. 
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Table 3: Relevance of intraregional trade for the South American economies
7
 
Country Exports to South 
America as share of 
GDP 
Secondary-sector 
exports as share of 
exports to South 
America 
Secondary-sector 
exports as share of 
exports to the world 
Argentina 6.8% 55.4% 36.7% 
Bolivia 19.7% 3.3% 14.5% 
Brazil 1.9% 74.7% 35.9% 
Chile 3.9% 63.5% 52.8% 
Colombia 2.5% 55.4% 22.5% 
Ecuador 7.7% 25.9% insufficient data 
Guyana 3.2% 5.0% insufficient data 
Paraguay 13.8% 13.9% 11.3% 
Peru 3.3% 57.1% 42.7% 
Suriname insufficient data insufficient data insufficient data 
Venezuela insufficient data insufficient data insufficient data 
Uruguay 6.4% 47.2% 29.2% 
Source: IADB 2013, data for 2011. 
 
Further indicators boost the argument that the entire region is, at least in quantitative 
terms, of low economic relevance to Brazil: Brazil’s most important trading partners 
are China (share of exports: 17.0 percent, imports: 14.5 percent) and the United States 
(exports: 10.8 percent, imports: 15.1 percent). Argentina is the third-most important 
trading partner with a share of 7.5 percent of Brazil’s exports and imports. It is 
followed by Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and South Korea, not by regional states 
(CIA 2013). As we will show now, politics creates further hurdles for Brazil’s role as a 
geoeconomic node. 
                                                          
7
 Comparing tables 1 and 3 reveals some inaccuracy, as data from the IADB suggests a lower relevance of 
primary-sector exports than data from the World Bank. 
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Political strategies 
Brazil’s foreign policy has for a long time been influenced by geography. Its push 
toward the west constitutes a historical pattern of expansion, coined Brazil’s “manifest 
destiny” by the American geographer Kelly (1997: 51-52). Similar to the United States 
in the 19th century, Brazil’s geopolitics has been marked by a defensive Atlantic frontier 
and an active western frontier. Today, the active western frontier is not about securing 
territorial claims against neighboring states. It aims at the integration of the Amazon 
area, i.e. Brazilian territory, into the Brazilian economy, which requires, first of all, 
transport infrastructure, and access to the Pacific Ocean in order to connect Brazil with 
the emerging Far Eastern markets. 
In spite of a clear priority of domestic projects, in particular the development of 
untapped resources in the Amazon area, the Brazilian government supports the 
expansion of Brazilian enterprises into South America. Inaugurated in 1952 to finance 
the state-led drive toward industrialization, the BNDES constitutes the main source of 
long-term capital on the domestic market. It is subordinated to the Ministry of 
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. When Lula da Silva came into office, 
development-oriented economists affiliated with the Workers’ Party (PT) took the lead 
of the bank. They began to advance industrial policies. During the Lula presidency, the 
BNDES more than doubled its investment portfolio (Santana 2011: 138). Since then, 
the bank has used its financial capacities to boost the regional expansion of the 
Brazilian economy. For instance, the bus rapid transit system in Colombia’s capital 
Bogotá was significantly enlarged in 2011. Supported by the BNDES, Brazilian 
companies provided 295 buses. The bank declared that its support was meant to 
strengthen the position of Brazilian automotive industries on the South American 
market (BNDES 2012: 157). 
A key means to boost the regional standing of Brazilian companies is the scheme 
“BNDES Finance and Enterprises”. It consists of credit lines that support, among other 
things, the internationalization of small and medium enterprises, are directed at 
specific sectors including energy and transport, and facilitate the import of capital 
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goods in order to modernize the Brazilian economy. Credits for the projects carried out 
abroad by Brazilian enterprises, covering up to 60 percent of the total costs, are 
granted under the condition that these projects contribute to the economic and social 
development of Brazil (BNDES 2013a). Given that Brazilian construction firms such as 
Odebrecht receive credits for building infrastructure in South America, the BNDES 
practically finances, within the aforementioned and considerable limits, the 
construction of a business environment that other Brazilian enterprises need for their 
regional expansion. The “BNDES Exim” scheme comprises various credit lines that ease 
Brazilian exports (BNDES 2013b). It dates back to 1991, when the bank started 
providing credits for capital goods sold to Latin American countries. Since 2011, it has 
given Brazilian exporters the proceeds for high value-added industrial sales in Latin 
America up front. The BNDES is presently able to grant credits of USD 625 million to 
eleven foreign banks (BNDES 2012: 156), which then provide loans to foreign 
companies that purchase Brazilian goods; it also provides open credit lines to states 
that are certain to spend these credits on Brazilian products. For instance, Argentina 
received credits of USD 1.2 billion from 2005 to 2009, which practically went into the 
pockets of Brazilian construction firms (Hochstetler & Montero forthcoming). What is 
more, the BNDES (2013c) has opened an office in Montevideo in 2009. Its objective is 
to foster ties with the Mercosur and the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI). Incentives for mergers of domestic firms offered by the BNDES, most notably 
in the past five years, have indirectly helped to promote the internationalization of 
Brazilian companies because of economies of scale that make them more competitive 
(de Abreu Campanarion et al. 2012: 7). With regard to the last mentioned issue, there 
is, however, not a preference for regional over global expansion. Most researchers see 
the BNDES as an agency of the globalization of Brazilian enterprises (Ramsey & 
Almeida 2010), not of regional integration. 
Yet, regional integration advances much more slowly than previously envisaged. The 
BNDES published studies on monetary integration between Argentina and Brazil at the 
beginning of this century (e.g. Giambiagi 2001) but no progress has been made since 
then. It rather appears that the topic has vanished from the debate. A major obstacle 
to Brazilian investment in South America is double taxation. Until today, the only South 
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American states that have signed agreements to avoid double taxation with Brazil are 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. In addition to this, Brazilian investment in its 
neighboring countries is hampered by fluctuating exchange rates. During the last five 
years, the exchange rate of the Brazilian Real to the Argentinian Peso fluctuated 
between 1:1.39 and 1:2.66. One Brazilian Real was officially worth 0.89 Venezuelan 
Bolívares in January 2009 but 3.19 in February 2013. In winter 2008/2009, the value of 
the Bolivian Boliviano jumped from 0.22 to 0.34 Reais. The failure of Brazilian giant 
Vale to realize a scheduled project for two dams in Argentina’s Santa Cruz province 
exemplifies that fluctuating exchange rates are worsened by discrepancies between 
the official and de-facto value of some regional currencies: Vale was unwilling to bring 
US Dollars at 5.20 Pesos (official rate), which would have been worth 9.80 Pesos (de-
facto rate) (MercoPress 2013). 
What is more, some regional states pursue policies on their resources that are 
counterproductive to regional cooperation. The most prominent case in this regard is 
Bolivia. In 2010, 68 percent of Bolivia’s natural gas output, i.e. 80 percent of its natural 
gas exports, went to Brazil (EIA 2012b: 6-7, 9). The Bolivian natural gas, pumped 
through a pipeline from the Santa Cruz area to São Paulo, is vital to the economy of 
Brazil’s economic heartland. The Bolivian-Brazilian natural gas trade would be a perfect 
example for economic relations of the regional core with the regional periphery, had 
the Bolivian government not forced Petrobras to re-negotiate its long-term contract in 
the course of the re-nationalization of its hydrocarbon resources, making Petrobras 
pay considerably higher royalties. Since then, the Morales government has re-
negotiated contracts with other foreign firms and nationalized Bolivia’s partially 
privatized companies Andina, Chaco and Transredes. Bolivia is not the only case that 
indicates that regional cooperation on essential economic assets is risky. Argentina 
used to be an exporter of oil and natural gas. Yet, its oil production peaked in the late 
1990s and has declined to slightly less than 800,000 barrels per day. Argentina’s 
natural gas reserves shrank by 50 per cent from 2002 to 2012. Insufficient investment 
and frequent strikes in the oil and natural gas sector further hamper production. At the 
same time, domestic oil consumption has been growing and reaches almost 700,000 
barrels per day now. Natural gas consumption already surpassed domestic production 
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in 2008. Since then, Argentina has experienced heavy wintertime shortages (EIA 
2012a: 2, 5-6). The government of Nestor Kirchner therefore imposed export 
restrictions, sometimes modifying them within a few days. 
Given the apparent insecurity involved in regional trade on energy resources, 
Petrobras has relatively reduced its commitment abroad. According to its business plan 
2010-2014, 95 percent of its investment is to be realized in Brazil (Petrobras 2010: 1-
2). In another business plan, Petrobras (2011: 4) specifies that imports of Bolivian 
natural gas will remain constant at 30 million cubic meters per day until 2020. 
Conventional domestic production is to increase from 55 to 102 million. Liquefied 
natural gas (from offshore sources) will surpass imports from Bolivia and reach 41 
million already in 2015. With regard to future exploration and exploitation, Petrobras 
(2013a: 24) concentrates on offshore oil and natural gas resources in the Atlantic 
Ocean close to São Paulo. The share of pre-salt sources, i.e. hardly exploitable 
resources located below salt layers, is to increase from seven to 31 percent.8 Chile, 
which relied on natural gas from Argentina in the early 2000s, has built liquefied-
natural-gas terminals, which became operational in 2009. They import primarily from 
Trinidad and Tobago (Hester/Weintraub 2010: 30). Brazil has also invested in liquefied 
natural gas (EIA 2012c: 7), opening another path toward independence from regional 
energy supplies. In one sentence, geographically given chances for regional 
cooperation are foregone because of political decisions that do not reflect what would 
be rational from a purely economic perspective.9  
The trouble about natural gas imports from Argentina and Bolivia experienced by Brazil 
and Chile is due to the general political orientation of Argentina and Bolivia, whose 
governments massively interfere in the economy. Brazil’s PT also adheres to state 
interventionism, albeit to a lesser extent than in Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela. 
                                                          
8
 Concentrating on domestic resources may prove an unsound strategy though. The exploration of Brazil’s 
offshore oil and natural gas fields has, so far, led to poor results. Given that the government has mandated 
Petrobras to acquire a minimum share in new pre-salt fields of 30 percent, the company has had to 
downscale its much more lucrative projects in Africa and Latin America. 
9
 Less dramatic but similar issues hamper intraregional transport of goods by road: Argentina limits 
Brazil-Chile shipments to a single route across its territory, which is significantly longer than the shortest 
route. In December 2003, the Argentinian government banned Uruguayan trucks from crossing its 
territory on the way to Paraguay. 
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While market oriented Chile, Colombia and Peru have signed free trade agreements 
with the world’s major economies, the Mercosur only has trade agreements with 
Egypt, Israel and Palestine, i.e. partnerships that hold a certain symbolic political value 
but are economically irrelevant. Its prospects of striking a deal with the European 
Union are dim. Furthermore, in 2012 Chile, Colombia and Peru plus Mexico launched 
the Pacific Alliance, a trade bloc that aims at free trade of goods and services, and 
seeks to speed up and protect investment from overseas. This bloc pulls three major 
South American countries further away from the Brazilian-dominated Mercosur and 
reinforces their global orientation. In a striking consistency with locational and physio-
geographical conditions, Brazil’s economic influence would then remain limited to its 
pre-Andean neighbors, potentially including Venezuela. 
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis of geographical and political conditions has shown that Brazil’s 
geoeconomic nodality is severely limited, and so are the prospects of regional 
integration. Distance and physio-geographical barriers separate Brazil from the Andean 
countries, Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela. Although Amazonian and Andean road 
corridors and waterways are to be rehabilitated in the context of IIRSA, it appears 
unlikely – at best uncertain – that these projects will soon become reality. 
Contrariwise, Brazil’s role as a geoeconomic node for the Southern Cone countries is 
eased by location and physical geography. Brazil’s core zone of population and 
economic activity, mainly the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, are relatively 
close to Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. The terrain is plain and rivers can be used 
for transport. Road infrastructure in the Southern Cone is comparatively dense. Yet, 
Brazil is rather pulled toward maritime than continental trade because its economic 
activity is concentrated on a coastal strip that is separated from the hinterland by the 
rugged Brazilian Highlands. Transport by container vessels to West Africa is easier for a 
company located in São Paulo than rail or road transport to any South American 
country, including the Southern Cone. 
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Energy resources provide a potential for cooperation with Argentina and Bolivia, and, 
excluding distance and physio-geographical barriers, also with Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela. However, apart from energy and automobiles, economic complementarity 
among South American countries is low. Exports of primary-sector products to Europe, 
North America and the Far East matter more than intraregional trade. Especially in the 
case of Brazil, the latter contributes only a marginal share to GDP. Even though the 
internationalization of large Brazilian enterprises has a South America bias, which is 
reinforced by measures of the BNDES that facilitate their regional expansion, there are 
major political constraints to Brazil’s role as a geoeconomic node. Government 
interference in the economy in Argentina and Bolivia has demonstrated that relying on 
neighboring countries as providers of key resources can be risky – this is why Brazil 
pushes for energy autarky. Efforts to overcome non-tariff barriers such as double 
taxation and fluctuating exchange rates have come to a standstill. The Pacific Alliance 
constitutes an economic bloc that pulls Chile, Colombia and Peru further toward the 
United States and the Far East – thus away from Brazil. Although more investigation on 
this matter is needed, it appears that Brazil’s economic expansion has not generated 
regional commodity chains. 
Our findings constitute a counterweight to the sometimes overly optimist statements 
by state authorities and intergovernmental organizations. A pessimist reading of this 
article would be wrong though. South America does hold a strategic relevance for the 
development of Brazil’s economy: as Table 3 shows, almost 75 percent of Brazil’s 
exports to the region are secondary-sector products, which is 40 percent more than 
the according share in Brazil’s total exports. The value of Brazilian manufactured 
exports to South America increased from USD 18 billion in 2005 to 34 billion in 2011. It 
was only USD eight billion in 1995 (IADB 2013). Hence, some may argue that an export-
led industrialization of Brazil depends on more trade with South America. Brazil’s 
current deindustrialization results from its integration into global trade as a supplier of 
unprocessed resources. Apart from that, one can make a case for a stronger Brazilian 
commitment to IIRSA, as it would also facilitate trade with the Far East. Given that, in 
addition to considerable distances, container vessels have to go through the congested 
Panama Channel, navigate around stormy Tierra del Fuego, or pass the insecure Strait 
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of Malacca, transregional corridors that connect Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo to ports 
at the Pacific Ocean should be relevant to Brazil. Thus, physical integration in some 
parts of South America may eventually be driven by Brazilian-Asian trade. 
Lastly, analyzing regional integration among developing states carries the risk of 
comparing projects such as Mercosur, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) or the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) to regional integration in Europe. 
Given the different histories of intraregional economic relations, and the relatively 
small and less developed markets in most countries of the former Third World, such a 
comparison is far too demanding. Regional integration among developing countries is, 
at least presently, about guaranteeing basic physical conditions that improve 
connectivity and foster greater regional interdependence. 
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